Essai d’une phénoménologie de la franchise
Essai de phénoménologie (2022), Annales des Mines - Gérer et Comprendre, 2022-2, (N°148), pages 13-23.
Franchising is an economic relationship between two independent actors, the franchisor and the franchisee. As such, it lends itself well to the application of economic (agency theory, incomplete contract theory, transaction costs, etc.) or managerial (stakeholder theory, empowerment, creativity management, etc.) models. But Dant (2008; Dant et al., 2011) pointed out that there is a lack of a true phenomenology of this complex relationship. This article attempts to produce this phenomenology in the form of an ordered staging of descriptions: a minimal description (an economic relationship between two agents who each have an interest in it), then some elements of complexity (an unbalanced, non-economic, multi-level, networked, agonistic, economic relationship). Finally, the dynamic scenarios of the franchise relationship are identified.
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