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X-HEC ECONOMICS THEORY SEMINAR 2010-2011

Date: Thursdays 2:30pm-4pm
Place: Ecole Polytechnique or HEC

Contact: Eduardo Perez (eduardo.perez "at" polytechnique.edu)

The program is also available as a Nous contacter&ctz=Europe/Paris&gsessionid=OK" href="https://www.google.com/calendar/embed?src=Nous contacter&ctz=Europe/Paris&gsessionid=OK">Google calendar.

2011

Wednesday, June 1st at 2:30pm is held at Ecole Polytechnique
Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University)
"Calibrated Incentive Contracts"

Abstract:"This paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability, moralhazard and adverse selection. The paper develops a robust approach to dynamic con-tracting based on calibrating the payos that would have been delivered by simplebenchmark contracts that are attractive but infeasible, due to limited liability con-straints. The resulting dynamic contracts are detail-free and satisfy robust perfor-mance bounds independently of the underlying process for returns, which need not bei.i.d. or even ergodic."

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May 26th at 2:30pm is held at Ecole Polytechnique
William Sudderth (U Minnesota)
"Asymptotic Behavior of a Stochastic Discount Rate"
with J. Geanakoplos, O. Zeitouni

Abstract: "The mean discount rate for a simple stochastic model behavesasymptotically roughly like 1=n^{1/2} in contrast to the usual geometric
discounting in a deterministic model."

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May 12th at 2:30pm is held at Ecole Polytechnique
Ron Siegel (Northwestern)
"Head Starts in Contests"

Abstract: "This paper studies equilibrium behavior in a class of games that models asymmetric multiprize competitions in which players' costs are not necessarily strictly decreasing. Such costs accommodate head starts, which capture incumbency advantages, prior investments, and technological differences. I provide an algorithm that constructs the unique equilibrium in which players do not choose weakly-dominated strategies, and apply it to study multiprize all-pay auctions with head starts. A comparison to the standard all-pay auction shows that the strategic effects of head starts dier substantially from those of diering valuations."

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The seminar is held at HEC
May 5th at 2:30pm -  
Andreas Blume 
(University of Pittsburgh)
"Language Barriers" (with Oliver Board)
 

Abstract:"Different people use language in different ways. Private information about language competence can be used to reject the idea that language is imperfectly shared. In optimal equilibria of common interest games there will generally be some benefit from communication with an imperfectly shared language, but the efficiency losses from private information about language competence in excess of those from limited competence itself may be signicant. In optimal equilibria of common-interest sender-receiver games, private information about language competence distorts and drives a wedge between the indicative meanings of messages (the decision-relevant information indicated by those messages) and their imperative meanings (the actions induced by those messages). Indicative meanings are distorted because information about decision relevant information becomes confounded with information about the sender's language competence. Imperative meanings of messages become distorted because of the uncertain ability of the receiver to decode them. We show that distortions of meanings persist with higher-order failures of knowledge of language competence. In a richer class of games, where both senders and receivers move at the action stage and where payos violate a self-signaling condition, these distortions may result in complete communication failure for any finite-order knowledge of language competence."

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May 19th at HEC
Jason Hartline (Northwestern)
TBA

May 26th at Ecole Polytechnique
William Sudderth (Minnesota)
TBA

June 1st at HEC
Sylvain Chassang (Princeton)
"Calibrated Incentive Contracts"

June 23rd at Ecole Poytechnique
Jon Eguia (NYU)
TBA
 


Past Seminars

2011

March 24th at HEC
David Ettinger (Dauphine)
"Reputation and Deception in a Repeated Expert/Agent Interaction: Theory and Experiments" (with Philippe Jehiel)

March 17th at Ecole Polytechnique
Annick Laruelle (Universidad del País Vasco)
"Discriminating by Tagging: Artificial Distinction, Real Discrimination" (with Elena Inarra)

March 3rd at Ecole Polytechnique
Sotiris Georganas (Royal Holloway)
"On the Persistence of Strategic Sophistication" (with PJ Healy and Roberto Weber)

February 10th at Ecole Polytechnique
Lucie Ménager (Université Lille 1)
"Strategic Communication with Exponential Bandits" (with Chantal Marlats)