Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
Arthur Campbell (Yale)
“Delay and Deadlines: Free-riding and Information Revelation in Partnership.”
Joint work with Florian Edererz (UCLA) Johannes Spinnewijnx (LSE and CEPR)
Abstract: We analyze costly information acquisition and information revelation in groups evaluating different decision options in a dynamic setting. Even when group members have perfectly aligned interests the group may inefficiently delay decisions. When deadlines are absent or far, uninformed group members freeride on each others ’efforts to acquire information. When deadlines come close, successful group members stop revealing their information in an attempt to incentivize others to continue searching for information. Surprisingly, setting a tighter deadline may increase the expected decision time and increase the expected accuracy of the decision in the unique equilibrium. As long as the deadline is set optimally, welfare is higher when information is only privately observable to the agent who obtained information rather than to the entire group.
Fabien Postel-Vinay (University of Bristol)
"Reputation and Pricing on the e-market: Evidence from a Major French Platform"
Joint work with Gregory Jolivet and Bruno Julien
Abstract: We use exhaustive data from a major French e-commerce website to conduct an empirical analysis of the effect on posted prices of seller reputation, as measured by average buyer feedback. We derive a price equation which we take to transaction data for four separate categories of goods: books, CDs, video games and DVDs. We address two identification issues: seller/product heterogeneity and the weak exogeneity of reputation (current prices affect future reputation through the feedback rating obtained following the current transaction). Our results show that these two issues may generate a large bias in the estimation of the effect of reputation on prices. We find that this effect is significant, positive, non-linear and, depending on the product category, substantial.
Regis Renault (Université Cergy-Pontoise)
"Push-Me Pull-you: Comparative Advertising in the OTC Analgesics Industry"
Joint work with Simon Anderson, Federico Ciliberto (University of Virginia) Jura Liaukonyte (Cornell University)
Abstract: We model comparative advertising as brands pushing up own brand perception and pulling down the brand image of targeted rivals. We watched all TV advertisements for OTC analgesics 2001-2005 to construct matrices of rival targeting and estimate the structural model. These attack matrices identify diversion ratios and hence comparative advertising damage measures. We find that outgoing comparative advertising attacks are half as powerful as self-promotion in raising own perceived quality and cause more damage to the targeted rival than benefit to the advertiser. Comparative advertising causes most damage through the pull-down effect and has substantial benefits to other rivals.
Emir Kamenica (Chicago Booth)
"Suspense and Surprise"
Joint work with Jeff Ely and Alex Frankel
Abstract: We model demand for non-instrumental information based on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period generates more suspense if variance of next period's beliefs is greater. A periode generates more surprise if current belief is further from last period's belief. Under these definitions, we analyse the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise experienced by a rational Bayesian audience. We apply our results to the design of entertainment-optimal mystery novels, political primaries, game shows, and sports.
Emeric Henry (Science Po)
"Voter Turnout and Fiscal Policy"
Joint work with Raphael Godefroy
Abstract: Though a large literature on the determinants of turnout has ourished, there is scant evidence on the causal impact of turnout on policies implemented in practice. Using data on French municipalities and instrumental variables for turnout based on temperature and inuenza incidence variations, we show that a one percent increase in turnout decreases on average the municipalities' yearly budget by 1.5 percent. This is mostly due to a decrease in spending on equipment or personnel. We show that this could be the result of a negative effect of turnout on the strength of the incumbent's majority combined with the fact that the incumbent promises higher budgets. We argue, in the context of a theoretical model, that these different facts could be natural consequences of the well documented incumbency advantage.
Michihiro Kandori (University of Tokyo)
"Asynchronous Revision Games"
Joint work with Y. Kamada
Abstract: We consider situations where players prepare their actions before playing a game. Prepared actions are mutuallly observable, and opportunities to revise prepared actions arrive stochastically, by independent, Poisson processes (one for each player). We show that the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium path can be characterized by an optimal control problem. Using this result, we examine what happens if one player has a higger arrival rate than the other.
Flavio Toxvaerd (University of Cambridge)
"The Optimal Control of Infectious Diseases via Prevention and Treatment"
Joint work with Robert Rowthorn
06/12/2011 Special session Xavier Vives (IESE): canceled
Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics)
"Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Value Perturbations"
Joint work with Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden, Takashi Kunimoto
Doh-Shin JEON (Toulouse School of Economics)
"Reputation as an Entry Barrier in the Credit Rating Industry"
Joint work with Stefano Lovo (HEC)
Rachel Kranton (Duke University)
"Redistribution: Identity vs. Ideology."
Karl Schlag (University of Vienna)
"Should I Stay or Should I Go?
Jordi Blanes i Vidal (LSE)
"Decision-Making and Implementation in Teams"
Jean-Marc Robin (Sciences-Po and University College of London)
"Marriage with Labor Supply"
Joint with Nicolas Jacquemet ( Paris School of Economics and University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Rodolfo Campos (IESE):
"Times of broken promises. Financial fragility vs. securization"
Joint with Gonzalo Islas ( Business School, Universidad Adolfo Ibanez)
Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics):
"Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets"
Joint with Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University)
Emmanuel Farhi (Harvard University) :
"Insurance and Taxation over the Life Cycle"
Joint with Iván Werning ( MIT )