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X

X ECONOMICS SEMINAR 2011-2012

  • Wednesdays 14:30-15:45

 

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Agenda 2012

13 juin 
Arthur Campbell (Yale) 
“Delay and Deadlines: Free-riding and Information Revelation in Partnership.”
Joint work with Florian Edererz (UCLA) Johannes Spinnewijnx (LSE and CEPR)

Abstract: We analyze costly information acquisition and information revelation in groups evaluating different decision options in a dynamic setting. Even when group members have perfectly aligned interests the group may inefficiently delay decisions. When deadlines are absent or far, uninformed group members freeride on each others ’efforts to acquire information. When deadlines come close, successful group members stop revealing their information in an attempt to incentivize others to continue searching for information. Surprisingly, setting a tighter deadline may increase the expected decision time and increase the expected accuracy of the decision in the unique equilibrium. As long as the deadline is set optimally, welfare is higher when information is only privately observable to the agent who obtained information rather than to the entire group.

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11 avril
Fabien Postel-Vinay (University of Bristol)
"Reputation and Pricing on the e-market: Evidence from a Major French Platform"
Joint work with Gregory Jolivet and Bruno Julien

Abstract: We use exhaustive data from a major French e-commerce website to conduct an empirical analysis of the effect on posted prices of seller reputation, as measured by average buyer feedback. We derive a price equation which we take to transaction data for four separate categories of goods: books, CDs, video games and DVDs. We address two identification issues: seller/product heterogeneity and the weak exogeneity of reputation (current prices affect future reputation through the feedback rating obtained following the current transaction). Our results show that these two issues may generate a large bias in the estimation of the effect of reputation on prices. We find that this effect is significant, positive, non-linear and, depending on the product category, substantial.

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4 Avril
Regis Renault (Université Cergy-Pontoise)
"Push-Me Pull-you: Comparative Advertising in the OTC Analgesics Industry"
Joint work with Simon Anderson, Federico Ciliberto (University of Virginia) Jura Liaukonyte (Cornell University)

Abstract: We model comparative advertising as brands pushing up own brand perception and pulling down the brand image of targeted rivals. We watched all TV advertisements for OTC analgesics 2001-2005 to construct matrices of rival targeting and estimate the structural model. These attack matrices identify diversion ratios and hence comparative advertising damage measures. We find that outgoing comparative advertising attacks are half as powerful as self-promotion in raising own perceived quality and cause more damage to the targeted rival than benefit to the advertiser. Comparative advertising causes most damage through the pull-down effect and has substantial benefits to other rivals.

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28 Mars
Emir Kamenica (Chicago Booth)
"Suspense and Surprise"
Joint work with Jeff Ely and Alex Frankel

Abstract: We model demand for non-instrumental information based on the idea that people derive entertainment utility from suspense and surprise. A period generates more suspense if variance of next period's beliefs is greater. A periode generates more surprise if current belief is further from last period's belief. Under these definitions, we analyse the optimal way to reveal information over time so as to maximize expected suspense or surprise experienced by a rational Bayesian audience. We apply our results to the design of entertainment-optimal mystery novels, political primaries, game shows, and sports.

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21 Mars
Emeric Henry (Science Po)
"Voter Turnout and Fiscal Policy"
Joint work with Raphael Godefroy

Abstract: Though a large literature on the determinants of turnout has ourished, there is scant evidence on the causal impact of turnout on policies implemented in practice. Using data on French municipalities and instrumental variables for turnout based on temperature and inuenza incidence variations, we show that a one percent increase in turnout decreases on average the municipalities' yearly budget by 1.5 percent. This is mostly due to a decrease in spending on equipment or personnel. We show that this could be the result of a negative effect of turnout on the strength of the incumbent's majority combined with the fact that the incumbent promises higher budgets. We argue, in the context of a theoretical model, that these different facts could be natural consequences of the well documented incumbency advantage.

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7 Mars 
Michihiro Kandori (University of Tokyo)
"Asynchronous Revision Games"
Joint work with Y. Kamada

Abstract: We consider situations where players prepare their actions before playing a game. Prepared actions are mutuallly observable, and opportunities to revise prepared actions arrive stochastically, by independent, Poisson processes (one for each player). We show that the optimal trigger strategy equilibrium path can be characterized by an optimal control problem. Using this result, we examine what happens if one player has a higger arrival rate than the other.

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Past seminars:

07/12/2011 
Flavio Toxvaerd (University of Cambridge)
"The Optimal Control of Infectious Diseases via Prevention and Treatment"
Joint work with Robert Rowthorn

06/12/2011 Special session Xavier Vives (IESE): canceled

30/11/2011 
Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics)
"Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Value Perturbations"
Joint  work with Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden, Takashi Kunimoto

23/11/2011   
Doh-Shin JEON (Toulouse School of Economics)
"Reputation as an Entry Barrier in the Credit Rating Industry"
Joint work with Stefano Lovo (HEC)

16/11/2011
Rachel Kranton (Duke University)
"Redistribution: Identity vs. Ideology." 

09/11/2011   
Karl Schlag (University of Vienna)
"Should I Stay or Should I Go? 

19/10/2011  
Jordi Blanes i Vidal (LSE)
"Decision-Making and Implementation in Teams"

12/10/2011
Jean-Marc Robin (Sciences-Po and University College of London) 
"Marriage with Labor Supply"
Joint with Nicolas Jacquemet ( Paris School of Economics and University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)  

05/10/2011
Rodolfo Campos (IESE): 
"Times of broken promises. Financial fragility vs. securization"
Joint with Gonzalo Islas ( Business School, Universidad Adolfo Ibanez)

21/09/2011 
Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics): 
"Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets"
Joint with Alessandro Pavan  (Northwestern University) 

28/09/2011
Emmanuel Farhi (Harvard University) : 
"Insurance and Taxation over the Life Cycle"
Joint with Iván Werning ( MIT )