# MICROECONOMICS SEMINAR 2012-2013

**Program June 201**

**3**

**June 12nd, 2013**

16:30-18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Pierre FLECKINGER**(Paris 1)

"Incentives for quality in friendly and hostile informational environments"

**June 19th, 2013**

Location: CREST Salle 18-119 au RCH MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Pascal COURTY**(U. Victoria)

Sales, Quantity Surcharge, and Consumer Inattention

Contact: Marie-Laure Allain

**June 26th, 2013**

16:30-18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Volker NOCKE**(Manheim)

**Archives**

Program May 2013

Program May 2013

**May 15th,2013 - CANCELED -**

16:30-18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Benny MOLDOVANU**(Bonn University)

contact: Marie-Laure Allain

**May 22nd, 2013**

16:30 - 18:00

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

**Stefan NAPEL**

**(Dept. of Economics, University of Bayreuth; Public Choice Research Centre, Turku)**

Joint work with Sascha Kurz (Dept. of Mathematics, University of Bayreuth) and Nicola Maaser (Dept. of Economics, University of Bremen)

Contact: Yukio Koriyama

**Extra seminar****May 29th, 2013**

16:30 - 18:00

**Srihari GOVINDAN**(Rochester) http://www.econ.rochester.edu/people/govindan/

"Competition for a Majority"

Abstract: We define the class of two-player zero-sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For games in this class we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, maximin and minimax strategies for the players, and a Nash equilibrium. We prove first that if all discontinuities favor one player then a value exists and that player has a maximin strategy. Then we establish that a general property called payoff approachability implies that the value results from an equilibrium. We prove further that this property implies that every modification of the discontinuities yields the same value; in particular, every modification has epsilon-equilibria. We apply these results to models of elections in which two candidates propose policies and a candidate wins election if a weighted majority of voters prefer his policy. We provide tie-breaking rules and assumptions about voters’ preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability, hence existence of equilibria, and each other tie-breaking rule yields the same value and has epsilon-equilibria. The assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the dimension of the space of policies is as large as the number of voters; or with no restriction on the dimension, if the electorate is large enough to approximate a continuum. These conclusions are then applied to the special case of Colonel Blotto games in which each candidate allocates his available resources among several constituencies and the assumption on voters’ preferences is that a candidate gets votes from those constituencies allocated more resources than his opponent offers. Moreover, for simple-majority rule we prove existence of an equilibrium that has zero probability of a tie.

Contact: Yukio Koriyama

**May 29th, 2013**

16:30-18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Maria GUADALOUPE**( Insead)

"Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance"

**Archives**

Program April 2013

Program April 2013

**April 3rd, 2013**

16:30 - 18:00

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

**Matias NUNEZ**( Université de Cergy)

“A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes”

joint work with Sébastien Courtin

Contact: Yukio Koriyama

**April 10th, 2013**

16:30 - 18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Mike RIORDAN**(Columbia)

"Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, and Cost Reduction"

Joint work with Simon Loertscher

Contact: Marie-Laure Allain

**April 17th, 2013**

16:30 - 18:00

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

**Melis KARTAL**(University of Vienne)

"Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout"

Proportional representation dominates majoritarian rule in a large electorate provided that the minority has sufficiently low participation costs or, equivalently, sufficiently high intensity of preferences. Dating back to John Stuart Mill, there has been a folk wisdom that proportional representation protects the minority against the “tyranny of the majority, ”but I show that it sometimes protects the majority against the “tyranny of the minority”.

Abstract: This paper investigates theoretically and experimentally the impact of proportional representation (PR) and majoritarian rule (MR) on voter participation and minority representation. Numerous empirical studies have questioned whether proportional representation fosters electoral participation. However, the empirical evidence regarding the comparison of turnout across MR and PR is mixed. Moreover papers that find increased participation under PR cannot explain why this is the case. This work shows that the comparison of turnout across PR and MR depends on the size of the minority. I also show that in both data and theory PR improves equity at a considerably low cost to efficiency if the size of the minority is sufficiently large. On the other hand, the representation of a small minority does not improve under PR. I conjecture that there is a discouragement effect when the size of the minority is small because the PR rule that I employ has a particularly disproportional form. Therefore, the impact of the voting rule on representation is very sensitive to both the size of the minority and the degree of proportionality. Finally, I find that individual behavior is consistent with theory: Most subjects either follow or learn to follow cuto strategies, as predicted by the theory.

**April 24th, 2013**

16:30 - 18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Denis GROMB**(Insead)

"Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers"

Joint work with M. Burkart, H. M. Mueller, and F. Panunzi

**Program March 2013**

**March 27th, 2013**

16:30-18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Jean-Pierre BENOIT**(LBS)

"On Attitude Polarization"

Contact: Marie-Laure Allain

**Program February 2013**

**February 6th, 2013**

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

**Jan BOONE**(Tilburg University)

"Does the market choose optimal health insurance coverage?"

**February 20th, 2013 -**** CANCELLED**

12:25-13:30

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

**Jérôme POUYET**(TSE)

"Foreclosure in Vertically Differentiated Markets"

Joint work with David Martimort

**Program January 2013**

**January 30th, 2013**

12:30-13:30

**Patrick REY**(TSE)

"Vertical Integration and Foreclosure in Multilateral Relations"

Joint work with Volker Nocke

**Archives Program December 2012**

**December 5th, 2012**

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

**Milo BIANCHI**(Université Paris Dauphine)

"Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors"

Joint work with Philippe Jehiel ( Paris School of Economics and University College London)

**December 12nd, 2012**

16:30-18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Joao MONTEZ**(LBS)

"How buy backs eliminate opportunism in vertical contracting"

**December 19th, 2012**

16:30-18:00

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

We show that in a very large class of games, if we assumed that players choose their ends in order to maximize in fine their utility, they will generally decide to maximize a different function than their own utility function. Since players are better off when maximizing an other objective function than their own utility function, it means that for a very large class of games, rationality as the maximization of one's own utility is self-defeating. We show that players choose their ends in order to get a strategic advantage on the other players, such that the strategy that maximizes their objective function is in fact the strategy they would play if they were a Stackelberg leader in the second stage game. Finally, we show that there exists a direct link between supermodularity and a cooperative behaviour in the second stage game.

**Program November**

**November 7th, 2012**

16:30-18:00

**Hiroshi YOSHIKAWA**(Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

"Stochastic Macro-equilibrium and Microfoundations for the Keynesian Economics"

Contact: Yukio Koriyama

**November 14th, 2012**

**Laurent LAMY**(TSE)

"Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?"

Joint work with Philippe Jehiel

**November 21st, 2012**

16:30-18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Pierre DUBOIS**(TSE)

"The Effects of Price Regulation on Pharmaceutical Industry Margins: A Structural Estimation for Anti-ulcer Drugs"

Joint work with Laura Lasio

**November 28th, 2012**

16:30-18:00

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

**Pierre BOYER**(U. Mannheim)

"Redistributive politics and public good provision: A mechanism design perspective"

Joint work with Felix Bierbrauer

**Program October**

**October 3rd, 2012**

16:30-18:00

**Yossi SPIEGEL**(Tel Aviv University)

"Partial vertical integration"

Joint work with David Gilo and Nadav Levy

**October 10th, 2012 - POSTPONED -**

16:30-18:00

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

**Pierre BOYER**(U Mannheim)

Title: "tba"

**October 17th, 2012**

16:30-18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

**Bruno JULLIEN**(TSE)

Title: "tba"