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MICROECONOMICS SEMINAR 2012-2013

 
Program June 2013

June 12nd, 2013
16:30-18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 

Pierre FLECKINGER (Paris 1)
"Incentives for quality in friendly and hostile informational environments"
Joint work with Matthieu Glachant and Gabrielle Moineville
***

June 19th, 2013

16:30-18:00
Location: CREST Salle 18-119 au RCH MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 
Pascal COURTY (U. Victoria)
Sales, Quantity Surcharge, and Consumer Inattention
 
Joint work with Sofronis Clerides

Contact: Marie-Laure Allain

***
June 26th, 2013
16:30-18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 
Volker NOCKE (Manheim)
 
***
Archives
Program May 2013

May 15th,2013 - CANCELED -
16:30-18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 

Benny MOLDOVANU (Bonn University)

contact: Marie-Laure Allain

***

May 22nd, 2013
16:30 - 18:00
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 

Stefan NAPEL (Dept. of Economics, University of Bayreuth; Public Choice Research Centre, Turku)

Joint work with Sascha Kurz (Dept. of Mathematics, University of Bayreuth) and Nicola Maaser (Dept. of Economics, University of Bremen)
 

Abstract: Which voting weights ought to be allocated to single delegates of dierently sized groups from a democratic fairness perspective? We operationalize the ‘one person, one vote’ principle by demanding every individual’s influence on collective decisions to be equal a priori. The analysis concerns intervals of alternatives. Weights should be proportional to the square root of constituency sizes if preferences are drawn independently from the same distribution for all agents. A Shapley value-based variation of simple proportionality to size becomes optimal if voters are polarized along constituency lines.

Contact: Yukio Koriyama

***

Extra seminar
May 29th, 2013
16:30 - 18:00

Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 
Joint work with Paulo Barelli and Robert Wilson 

Abstract: We define the class of two-player zero-sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For games in this class we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, maximin and minimax strategies for the players, and a Nash equilibrium. We prove first that if all discontinuities favor one player then a value exists and that player has a maximin strategy. Then we establish that a general property called payoff approachability implies that the value results from an equilibrium. We prove further that this property implies that every modification of the discontinuities yields the same value; in particular, every modification has epsilon-equilibria. We apply these results to models of elections in which two candidates propose policies and a candidate wins election if a weighted majority of voters prefer his policy. We provide tie-breaking rules and assumptions about voters’ preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability, hence existence of equilibria, and each other tie-breaking rule yields the same value and has epsilon-equilibria. The assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the dimension of the space of policies is as large as the number of voters; or with no restriction on the dimension, if the electorate is large enough to approximate a continuum. These conclusions are then applied to the special case of Colonel Blotto games in which each candidate allocates his available resources among several constituencies and the assumption on voters’ preferences is that a candidate gets votes from those constituencies allocated more resources than his opponent offers. Moreover, for simple-majority rule we prove existence of an equilibrium that has zero probability of a tie.

Contact: Yukio Koriyama
 

***
May 29th, 2013
16:30-18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 
Maria GUADALOUPE ( Insead)
"Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance"
Joint work with Vicente Cunat and Mireia Gine
***
 
Archives
Program April 2013

April 3rd, 2013
16:30 - 18:00
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 

Matias NUNEZ ( Université de Cergy)
“A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes”
joint work with Sébastien Courtin
 
Abstract: We study large elections in which strategic voters vote according to Approval Voting. We prove that in general almost any candidate can win in equilibrium. Nonetheless, under some simple restrictions over social preferences, i.e. in asymmetric elections, the multiplicity of equilibria vanishes. We hence can build a map that associates any asymmetric preference profile to its set of Approval voting equilibria outcomes in three candidate elections. This set is close even though not equivalent to the Top-Cycle set.

Contact: Yukio Koriyama

***

April 10th, 2013
16:30 - 18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 

Mike RIORDAN (Columbia)
"Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, and Cost Reduction"
Joint work with Simon Loertscher

Contact: Marie-Laure Allain
 

***
April 17th, 2013
16:30 - 18:00
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 
 Melis KARTAL (University of Vienne)
"Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Electoral Systems with Endogenous Turnout"
 
This presentation is based on 2 papers:
Abstract: Analyzing the welfare properties of proportional representation and majoritarian rule in the presence of groups with opposing interests and diverse characteristics is the focus of this paper. The welfare ranking of voting rules depends on the size of groups and on the type of participation  costs. If costs are deterministic and identical for citizens then majoritarian rule and proportional representation generate the same level of welfare. On the other hand, majoritarian  rule dominates proportional representation if voting costs are drawn from a distribution that is identical for all citizens. I explain the contrast in these results using the finding by Borgers (2004) that the symmetric equilibrium participation under MR is excessive. The welfare ranking of voting rules also depends on whether or not costs are group-specific: 
Proportional representation dominates majoritarian rule in a large electorate provided that the minority has sufficiently low participation costs or, equivalently, sufficiently high intensity of preferences. Dating back to John Stuart Mill, there has been a folk wisdom that proportional representation protects the minority against the “tyranny of the majority, ”but I show that it sometimes protects the majority against the “tyranny of the minority”.

Abstract: This paper investigates theoretically and experimentally the impact of proportional representation (PR) and majoritarian rule (MR) on voter participation and minority representation. Numerous empirical studies have questioned whether proportional representation fosters electoral participation. However, the empirical evidence regarding the comparison of turnout across MR and PR is mixed. Moreover papers that find increased participation under PR cannot explain why this is the case. This work shows that the comparison of turnout across PR and MR depends on the size of the minority. I also show that in both data and theory PR improves equity at a considerably low cost to efficiency if the size of the minority is sufficiently large. On the other hand, the representation of a small minority does not improve under PR. I conjecture that there is a discouragement effect when the size of the minority is small because the PR rule that I employ has a particularly disproportional form. Therefore, the impact of the voting rule on representation is very sensitive to both the size of the minority and the degree of proportionality. Finally, I find that individual behavior is consistent with theory: Most subjects either follow or learn to follow cuto strategies, as predicted by the theory.

Contact: Yukio Koriyama
***
April 24th, 2013
16:30 - 18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
Denis GROMB (Insead)
"Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers"
Joint work with M. Burkart, H. M. Mueller, and F. Panunzi
Contact: Marie-Laure Allain
 
***
 
Program March 2013

March 27th, 2013
16:30-18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, MK2, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff

 
Jean-Pierre BENOIT (LBS)
"On Attitude Polarization"

Contact: Marie-Laure Allain

***
 
Program February 2013

 

February 6th, 2013
12:15-13:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 
Jan BOONE (Tilburg University)
"Does the market choose optimal health insurance coverage?"
 
***

February 20th, 2013 - CANCELLED
12:25-13:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 

Jérôme POUYET  (TSE)
"Foreclosure in Vertically Differentiated Markets"
Joint work with David Martimort
 
***
 
Program January 2013
 
January 30th, 2013
12:30-13:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 
Patrick REY (TSE)
"Vertical Integration and Foreclosure in Multilateral Relations"
Joint work with Volker Nocke
 
***
 
Archives Program December 2012
December 5th, 2012
16:30-18:00
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 
Milo BIANCHI  (Université Paris Dauphine)
"Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors"
Joint work with Philippe Jehiel ( Paris School of Economics and University College London)
 
Contact: Yukio Koriyama
 
Abstract: We consider a competitive financial market in which companies engage in strategic financial reporting knowing that investors only pay attention to finitely many aspects of firms’ reports and extrapolate from their sample. We investigate the extent to which stock prices differ from the fundamental values, assuming that companies must report all their activities but are otherwise free to disaggregate their reports as they wish. We show that no matter how many aspects investors are able to consider, a monopolist can induce a price of its stock bounded away from the fundamental. Besides, competition between companies may exacerbate stock mispricing.
 
***
December 12nd, 2012
16:30-18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 
Joao MONTEZ (LBS)
"How buy backs eliminate opportunism in vertical contracting"
 
***
December 19th, 2012
16:30-18:00
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 
Guilhem LECOUTEUX (Department of Economics)
The Rational Choice of End in Economics"
Abstract: We discuss the definition of rationality in economics, and suggest not to limit rational choice to the mere choice of means, but to extend it to the choice of ends. We suggest that players can rationally choose their own objectives, and introduce the -equilibrium as a new notion of equilibrium in non cooperative game theory in order to modelize such a decision process. From the distinction Sen suggested between sympathy and commitment, we suppose that players can make the distinction between their private utility -- the utility they will effectively perceive from the game -- and the function they want to maximize; we then suppose that players choose in a first stage game this objective function, such that its maximization in a second stage game maximizes in fine their private utility. This rational choice of ends also provides us an analytical framework for explaining the endogenous formation of coalitions in non cooperative games, since we assume that players who share the same objectives are able to team reason. 
We show that in a very large class of games, if we assumed that players choose their ends in order to maximize in fine their utility, they will generally decide to maximize a different function than their own utility function. Since players are better off when maximizing an other objective function than their own utility function, it means that for a very large class of games, rationality as the maximization of one's own utility is self-defeating. We show that players choose their ends in order to get a strategic advantage on the other players, such that the strategy that maximizes their objective function is in fact the strategy they would play if they were a Stackelberg leader in the second stage game. Finally, we show that there exists a direct link between supermodularity and a cooperative behaviour in the second stage game.
Contact: Yukio Koriyama
***
 
Program November
 
November 7th, 2012
16:30-18:00
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
Hiroshi YOSHIKAWA (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)
"Stochastic Macro-equilibrium and Microfoundations for the Keynesian Economics"
 
Abstract: This paper begins with pointing out limitations of the standard labor search theory. It presents an alternative concept of stochastic macro-equilibrium based on the principle of statistical physics. This concept of equilibrium is motivated by the presence of all kinds of unspecifiable micro shocks in the macroeconomy. Our model mimics the empirically observed distribution of labor productivity. The distribution of productivity depends crucially on aggregate demand. When aggregate demand rises, more workers are employed by firms with higher productivity. At the same time, the unemployment rate declines. The result provides correct micro-foundation for Keynes’ principle of effective demand.

Contact: Yukio Koriyama

 
***
 
 November 14th, 2012
16:30-18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 
Laurent LAMY (TSE)
"Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?"
Joint work with Philippe Jehiel
 
***
November 21st, 2012
16:30-18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 
Pierre DUBOIS (TSE)
"The Effects of Price Regulation on Pharmaceutical Industry Margins: A Structural Estimation for Anti-ulcer Drugs"
Joint work with Laura Lasio
 
***
 
November 28th, 2012
16:30-18:00
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 
Pierre BOYER (U. Mannheim)
"Redistributive politics and public good provision: A mechanism design perspective" 
Joint work with Felix Bierbrauer
Contact: Yukio Koriyama
 
***

Program October

October 3rd, 2012
16:30-18:00

Location: CREST salle S016, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 
Yossi SPIEGEL (Tel Aviv University) 
"Partial vertical integration"
Joint work with David Gilo and Nadav Levy
 
Contact: Marie-Laure Allain 
 
***
 
October 10th, 2012 - POSTPONED -
16:30-18:00
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
 
Pierre BOYER (U Mannheim) 
Title: "tba"
 
Contact : Yukio Koriyama 
 
***
 
October 17th, 2012
16:30-18:00
Location: CREST salle S016, 15 Boulevard Gabriel Péri 92245 Malakoff
 
Bruno JULLIEN (TSE) 
Title: "tba"
 
***