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DEPARTMENT SEMINAR 2013-2014

 
Program June 2014
June 3, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Sonia OREFFICE (University of Surrey and IZA)

Title: "Bidimensional Matching with Heterogeneous Preferences: Smoking in the Marriage Market"
Joint work with Pierre-André Chiappori (Columbia University) and Climent Quintana-Domeque (University of Oxford and IZA)
 

Abstract: We develop a bidimensional matching model under transferable utility, where individuals are characterized by a continuous trait (e.g., socioeconomic status) and a binary attribute (e.g., smoking status). The model is "truly multidimensional", in the sense that the impact of the traits cannot be summarized by a one-dimensional index. We present a general resolution strategy based on optimal control theory, and characterize the stable matching. We derive testable predictions about equilibrium matching patterns. Using US data, we find that the observed marital sorting of smokers and non-smokers by education is consistent with our model.
Organized by Raïcho Bojilov
*****
June 10, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Robert SAUER (Royal Holloway London)

Title: "Does It Pay for Women to Volunteer?"
 

Abstract: This paper estimates the economic and non-economic returns to volunteering for prime-aged women. A woman’s decision to engage in unpaid work, and to marry and have children, is formulated as a forward-looking discrete choice dynamic programming problem. Simulated maximum likelihood estimates of the model indicate that an extra year of volunteer experience increases wage offers in part-time work by 8.3% and wage offers in full-time work by 2.4%. The behavioral model also reveals an adverse selection mechanism which is consistent with the negative returns to volunteering found in reduced-form wage regressions. The negative selection is driven by differential unobserved market-productivity and heterogeneous marginal utilities of future consumption. The structural estimates also imply that the economic returns to volunteering are relatively more important than non-economic returns, and introduction of a tax-credit for volunteering-related childcare expenses would substantially increase volunteer labor supply and female lifetime earnings.
Organized by Raïcho Bojilov
*****
 
June 16, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Laurent MATHEVET (New York University)

Title: "Axiomatic Behavior in Repeated Interactions"
 

Abstract: Suppose that in repeated interactions, players eventually engage in a pattern of action profiles, which we call a social convention. Do some social conventions seem more plausible than others? We answer axiomatically based on principles of rationality and efficient simplicity. After studying the complexity required by efficient simplicity, we characterize the axioms’ solutions. The main solution says that social conventions should be constant repetitions of a static Nash equilibrium, or such that players switch between two Pareto unranked profiles (across which they each change action). The paper also reports experimental evidence that supports our findings. This approach generalizes the standard frameworks of axiomatic bargaining (Nash (1950)) and of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Among other things, it provides a testbed for selection arguments in repeated interactions:in some games, it takes remarkably little to reduce the multiplicity of outcomes
and even get uniqueness.
Organized by Yukio Koriyama
*****
 
June 17, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

David HEMOUS (INSEAD)

Title: "The Rise of the Machines: Automation, Horizontal Innovation and Income Inequality"
 

Abstract: We construct an endogenous growth model of directed technical change with automation— the introduction of machines which replace low-skill labor and complement high-skill labor — and horizontal innovation — the introduction of new products, which increases demand for both types of labor. Machines are produced with the same technology as the consumption good. The level of technology in the economy is characterized by the number of products and the share of these that are automated. For general processes of technology, we demonstrate that although low-skill wages can drop during periods of increasing automation intensity the asymptotic growth rate is positive, though lower than that of the economy. We then endogenize the evolution of technology and derive an asymptotic steady state. Through numerical simulations, we show that the transitional path follows three phases. First, wages are low such that few machines are used and low-skill wages keep pace with the growth rate of the economy. Then, as wages grow the share of automated products increases and the economy substitutes towards the use of machines which depresses the growth rate of low-skill wages, potentially to negative. Finally, as the economy reaches steady state the share of automated products is constant and the relative growth rate of low-skill wages picks up though it remains lower than that of the economy. We extend the model to include middle-skill workers and demonstrate that the model endogenously captures two important characteristics of the U.S. income distribution over the past 50 years: initially a monotone dispersion of the income distribution, and thereafter a wage growth polarization, in which middle-skill workers experience the lowest wage growth. Finally, in an extension we allow machines to be produced with a different technology than the consumption good. This allows for faster productivity growth for machines which can potentially lead to permanently negative growth of low-skill wages.
Organized by Isabelle Méjean
*****
June 24, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Leonard WANTCHEKON  (Princeton)

Title: "TBA"

Organized by Yukio Koriyama

***** 
 
 
 
Archives
May 5, 2014 (Special Session)
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
12:00 - 13:30

David LEVINE (EUI and Washington University in St. Louis)

Title: "Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
Joint work with with S. Modica (University of Palermo, Italy)
 

Abstract: In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their exclusiveness we find that these hegemonies will be infficciently extractive in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare. The theory also predicts that they are most likely overthrown by zealots who maximize power ignoring incentive constraints.
*****
May 6, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Orazio ATTANASIO  (UCL)

Title: "Estimating the production function for human capital : evidence from Colombia"
 

*****
 
May 13, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Johanna WALLENIUS (Stockholm School of Economics)

Title: "Retirement, Home Production and Labor Supply Elasticities"
Joint work with Richard Rogerson (Princeton University)
 

Abstract: We show that a life cycle model with home production implies a tight relationship between key preference parameters and the changes in time allocated to home production and leisure at retirement. We derive this rerelationship and use data from the ATUS to explore its quantitative implications. Our method implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure is quite large, in excess of one and possibly as high as two. 
 
 
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May 20, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Sidartha GORDON (Sciences Po)

Title: "Games with an Endogenous Information Structure"
Joint work with Catherine Gendron-Saulnier (Université de Montréal)


 
*****
 
May 27, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

V. BHASKAR (University College London)

Title: "The Ratchet Effect Re-examined: A Learning Perspective"
 

Abstract: We study dynamic moral hazard where principal and agent are symmetrically uncertain about job diffculty. Since effort is unobserved, shirking leads the principal to believe that the job is hard, increasing the agent's continuation value. So deterring shirking requires steeper incentives, which induce the agent to over-work today, since he can quit if the principal believes that the job is easy. With continuous effort choices, no interior effort is implementable in the first period. The agent's continuation value function is non-differentiable and convex, since the principal makes the agent indifferent between his discretev(participation) choices in the second period. The problem can be solved if the agent's participation decision is made continuous, or if there are long-term commitments, and we provide conditions for the first order approach to work. However, the impossibility result recurs in other agency models that combine discrete and continuous choices.
 
 
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 April 1, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

David DORN (CEMFI)

Title: "Trade Adjustment: Worker Level Evidence"


 
Abstract: In the past two decades, China’s manufacturing exports have grown spectacularly, U.S. imports from China have surged, but U.S. exports to China have increased only modestly. Using representative, longitudinal data on individual earnings by employer, we analyze the effect of exposure to import competition on earnings and employment of U.S. workers over 1992 through 2007. Individuals who in 1991 worked in manufacturing industries that experienced high subsequent import growth garner lower cumulative earnings and are at elevated risk of exiting the labor force and obtaining public disability benefits. They spend less time working for their initial employers, less time in their initial two-digit manufacturing industries, and more time working elsewhere in manufacturing and outside of manufacturing. Earnings losses are larger for individuals with low initial wages, low initial tenure, low attachment to the labor force, and those employed at large firms with low wage levels. Import competition also induces substantial job churning among high-wage workers, but they are better able than low-wage workers to move across employers with minimal earnings losses, and are less likely to leave their initial firm during a mass layoff. These findings, which are robust to a large set of worker, firm and industry controls, and various alternative measures of trade exposure, reveal that there are significant worker-level adjustment costs to import shocks, and that adjustment is highly uneven across workers according to their conditions of employment in the pre-shock period.
 
*****
April 8, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Mathias THOENIG (HEC Lausanne)

Title: "Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa"
Joint work with Michael König, Dominic Rohner, Fabrizio Zilibotti

Abstract:  Many wars involve complicated webs of alliances and rivalries between multiple actors. Examples include the recent civil wars in Somalia, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. We study from a theoretical and empirical perspective how the network of military alliances and rivalries affects the overall conflict intensity, destruction and death toll. The theoretical analysis combines insights from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We construct a non-cooperative model of tactical fighting featuring two novel externalities: each group’s strength is augmented by the fighting effort of its allied, and weakened by the fighting effort of its rivals. We achieve a closed form characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the fighting game, and of how the network structure affects individual and total fighting efforts. We then perform an empirical analysis using data for the Second Congo (DRC) War, a conflict involving many groups and a complex network of alliances and rivalries. We obtain structural estimates of the fighting externalities, and use them to infer the extent to which the removal of each group involved in the conflict would reduce the conflict intensity.

 
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April 8, 2014 Special Seminar
14:00-15:00
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Phil RENY (University of Chicago)

Title: "Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions
Joint work with Roger B. Myerson (University of Chicago)

Abstract: Guided by several key examples, we formulate a definition of sequential equilibrium for muti-stage games with infinite type sets and infinite action sets, and we prove its existence for a class of games.
 

*****
 
April 29, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Sascha BECKER (Warwick)

Title: "Fertility and the Labor Market"

*****
 
March 4, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► Péter ESÖ (Oxford)

Title: "Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result"
Joint work with Balázs Szentes (LSE)
 

Abstract: This paper considers a general, dynamic contracting problem with adverse selection and moral hazard, in which the agent’s type stochastically evolves over time. The agent’s final payoff depends on the entire history of private and public information, contractible decisions and the agent’s hidden actions, and it is linear in the transfer between her and the principal. We transform the model into an equivalent one where the agent’s subsequent information is independent in each period. Our main result is that for any fixed decision-action rule implemented by a mechanism, the maximal expected revenue that the principal can obtain is the same as if the principal could observe the agent’s orthogonalized types after the initial period. In this sense, the dynamic nature of the relationship is irrelevant: the agent only receives information rents for her initial private information. We also show that any monotonic decision-action rule can be implemented in a Markov environment satisfying certain regularity conditions.
 
*****
 
March 11, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► Sebastian KOEHNE (IIES, Stockholm University)

Title: "Optimal taxation in a habit formation economy"
Joint work with Moritz Kuhn (University of Bonn)
 

Abstract: We study implications of habit formation for optimal taxation. First, we show that taxation problems with habit formation can be analyzed using dynamic programming techniques. Second, we derive optimal labor and savings wedges for habit formation preferences.
We show that habit formation counteracts the conventional Mirrleesian distortions and calls for subsidies to labor supply and savings. We demonstrate that the theoretical results are quantitatively important: in a stylized life-cycle model, average labor and savings wedges fall by more than one third compared to time-separable references. Third, we exploit the analogy between habit formation and durable consumption to study the taxation of durable and nondurable commodities."
***** 
 
 
March 18, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► Johannes HORNER (YALE)

Title: "Multi-stage unmediated communication in a sender-receiver model"

Organized by Yukio Koriyama

 
March 25, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► Gabrielle FACK (UPF)

Title: "Improving College Access and Success for Low-Income Students: Evidence from a Large Need-based Grant Program"
Joint work with Julien Grenet (Paris School of Economics)

Abstract: Using comprehensive administrative data on France’s single largest financial aid program, this paper provides new evidence on the impact of large-scale need-based grant programs on the college enrollment decisions, persistence and graduation rates of low-income students. We exploit sharp and graduation rates of low-income students. We exploit sharp discontinuities discontinuities comes at different levels of study. We find that eligibility for an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros increases college enrollment rates by up to 5 percentage points. Moreover, we show that need-based grants have positive effects on student persistence and degree completion.
 
Organized by Raïcho Bojilov
 
February 4, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

 Friederike MENGEL (University of Essex)

Title: "Compliance Behavior in Networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment"
 

Organized by Raïcho Bojilov

January 7, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Imran RASUL (UCL)

Title: "State-Building, Mass Migration and Compulsory Schooling in US States". 
Joint work with Oriana Bandiera (LSE), Myra Mohnen (UCL) and Martina Viarengo (Graduate Institute, Geneva)

Organized by : Raïcho Bojilov

January 21, 2014
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Pierre-Olivier WEILL (UCLA)

Title: "The Market for OTC Derivatives". 
Joint work with Andrew G. Atkeson and Andrea L. Eisfeldt
 

Abstract: We develop a model of equilibrium entry, trade, and price formation in over-the- counter (OTC) markets. Banks trade derivatives to share an aggregate risk subject to two trading frictions: they must pay a fixed entry cost, and they must limit the size of the positions taken by their traders because of risk-management concerns. Although all banks in our model are endowed with access to the same trading technology, some large banks endogenously arise as “dealers,” trading mainly to provide intermediation services, while medium sized banks endogenously participate as “customers” mainly to share risks. We use the model to address positive questions regarding the growth in OTC markets as trading frictions decline, and normative questions of how regulation of entry impacts welfare.
If you would like to have lunch, dinner or a bilateral meeting with the speaker, please contact Isabelle Méjean.

Organized by Isabelle Méjean

December 3, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Jan STOOP (Erasmus University)

"On the role of group size in tournaments: theory and evidence from lab and field experiments"
Joint work with John List, Daan van Soest and Haiwen Zhou. 

Abstract: We explore how equilibrium effort in tournaments (for example used as an incentive mechanism in firms) varies with the number of contestants. The probability of winning a tournament depends on both effort and luck, and we show that the assumed distribution of the shock component is critical in whether equilibrium effort increases with group size, or not. We find that if there is much (little) mass on good draws, equilibrium effort is an increasing (decreasing) function of the number of contestants. We test our theory by implementing a laboratory experiment, where important features of the theory can be exogenously imposed. We proceed to execute a field experiment, where we rely on biological models complemented by economic models to inform us of the relevant theoretical predictions. In both cases we find that the theory has a fair amount of explanatory power. More generally, from a methodological perspective our study showcases the benefits of combining data from both lab and field experiments to test economic theory.
Organized by: Raïcho Bojilov
 
December 10, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► Gilles SAINT PAUL (Paris School of Economics, New York University Abu Dhabi and Toulouse School of Economics)

Title: "How Darwinian should an economy be?"

Organized by: Isabelle Méjean

 
December 17, 2013 cancelled
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► John RUST (Georgetown University)

Title: "tba"

Organized by: Raïcho Bojilov

November 5th, 2013 cancelled
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Daniel GARRETT (TSE)

Title: "Incoming demand with private uncertainty"
 

Abstract: We study a profit-maximizing monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with constant values, optimal full-commitment prices fluctuate over time. We show how the pattern of optimal prices at a steady state can be understood by considering a stationary dynamic program. Departing from the stationary setting, we illustrate how changes in the arrival rate of buyers to the market can affect optimal pricing, providing a novel rationale for countercyclical markups.
 
Organized by: Raïcho Bojilov
November 12, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081
Marc MELITZ (Harvard University, NBER and CEPR)

Title: "Firm Heterogeneity and Aggregate Welfare"
Joint work with Stephen J. Redding (Princeton University, NBER and CEPR)
 

Abstract: We examine how firm heterogeneity influences aggregate welfare through endogenous firm selection. We consider a homogeneous firm model that is a special case of a heterogeneous firm model with a degenerate productivity distribution. Keeping all structural parameters besides the productivity distribution the same, we show that the two models have different aggregate welfare implications, with larger welfare gains from reductions in trade costs in the heterogeneous firm model. Calibrating parameters to key U.S. aggregate and firm statistics, we find these differences in aggregate welfare to be quantitatively important (up to a few percentage points of GDP). Under the assumption of a Pareto productivity distribution, the two models can be calibrated to the same observed trade share, trade elasticity with respect to variable trade costs, and hence welfare gains from trade (as shown by Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012); but this requires assuming different elasticities of substitution between varieties and different fixed and variable trade costs across the two models.
 
Organized by: Isabelle Méjean
November 19, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Martin PEITZ (U. Mannheim)

Title: "See-saws, Swings and Roundabouts in Media Markets"
 

Abstract: We analyze the positive and normative effects of policy interventions in oligopolistic advertising-financed media markets. We uncover a general see-saw effect: Changes in the market structure that make the consumer side better off tend to make the advertiser side worse off. In our framework the impacts of market structure changes on the three groups---advertisers, platforms and consumers---are tied together by a simple summary statistic. The prohibition of a profitable merger is consumer-surplus increasing, but tends to be advertiser-surplus decreasing if viewers have unlimited attention for ads. This result can swing around if consumers have limited attention.

Organized by: Yukio Koriyama 

 
November 26, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► Stephane GUIBAUD (LSE)

Title: "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover" 
 

Abstract: We introduce `growth-induced' managerial turnover in a dynamic moral hazard model of a firm subject to stochastic growth opportunities. Firms dismiss their managers for incentive provision after poor performance, but also when they need a manager with a different set of skills to take advantage of growth opportunities. The optimal incentive contract may involve managerial entrenchment, such that growth opportunities are foregone after good performance. The use of golden parachutes is suboptimal, unless the firm needs to incentivize its managers to truthfully report the arrival of growth opportunities. The model delivers a rich set of predictions for the distribution of CEO tenure length and compensation profiles over tenure, and for their variation across firms.
Joint work with  Ron Anderson and Cecilia Bustamante (LSE)
 
Organized by: Isabelle Méjean
 
 
October 1, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► Laurent LAMY (PSE)

Title: "Participation and discrimination in procurement auctions" (joint with Philippe Jehiel)

Abstract: We propose a new model of auctions with endogenous participation where the number of bidders from each group of potential entrants follows a Poisson distribution. The model allows very general forms of asymmetries by imposing no structure on the valuation distribution of each group of entrants but also by having possibly some incumbents that enter the auction for sure and whose rents are internalized by the seller. We first establish a general non-discrimination result: Without incumbents, the seller should propose a format that allocates the good efficiently among the set of entrants and the corresponding entry rates are necessarily efficient for an ex-ante perspective. With incumbents and under an information structure à la Myerson (1981), we characterize the seller's optimal design which involves discrimination against the incumbents and can be implemented with a second-price auction with a non-linear bid preference program. We then adopt a positive design perspective by analyzing standard instruments, in particular the reserve price policy which do not allow direct discrimination against incumbents. On the whole, we provide simple answers to hugely debated questions among which bid preferences (or affirmative action) programs, the reserve price policy against a bidding-ring and favoritism toward domestic firms. Our results are also useful regarding the econometric literature that deals with structural models with endogenous entry.
*****
 

October 8, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► Thierry MAGNAC (TSE)

Title: "Post schooling human capital investments and the life cycle variance of earnings"

Abstract: We propose an original model of human capital investments after leaving school in which individuals differ in their initial human capital obtained at school, their rate of return, their costs of human capital investments and their terminal values of human capital at a fixed date in the future. We derive a tractable reduced-form Mincerian model of log-earnings profiles along the life cycle which is written as a linear factor model in which levels, growth and curvature of earnings profiles are individual-specific. Using panel data from a single cohort of French male wage earners observed over a long span of 30 years, a random effect model is estimated first by pseudo maximum likelihood methods. This step is followed by a simple second step fixed effect method by which individual-specific structural parameters are estimated. This allows us to test restrictions, compute counterfactual profiles and evaluate how earnings inequality over the life-cycle is affected by changes in structural parameters. Under some conditions, even small changes in life expectancy seem to imply large changes in earnings inequality.
*****
 

October 15, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

► Serguei KANIOVSKI (WIFO)

Title: "The Minimum Sum Representation as an Index of Voting Power" with Josep Freixas

Abstract: We propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a weighted voting game. The MSR offers a redesign of a voting game, such that voting power as measured by the MSR index becomes proportional to voting weight. The MSR index is a coherent measure of power that is ordinally equivalent to the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and Johnston indices. We provide a characterization for a bicameral meet as a weighted game or a complete game, and show that the MSR index is immune to the bicameral meet paradox. We discuss the computation of the MSR index using a linear integer program and the inverse MSR problem of designing a weighted voting game with a given distribution of power.
 
*****
 
September 10, 2013

11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Miles KIMBALL (University of Michigan)

Title: "Breaking Through the Zero Lower Bound
 

*****
 

September 17, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Glen WEYL (University of Chicago)

Title: "Quadratic Vote Buying"

Abstract: A group of individuals with access to transfers seeks to make a binary collective decision. All known mechanisms they might use are either are often inefficient (e.g. voting), subject to severe collusion problems (e.g. the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism) or require the planner being informed about the distribution of valuations (e.g. the Expected Externality mechanism). I propose a simple, budget-balanced mechanism inspired by the work of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979). Individuals purchase votes with the cost of a marginal vote being linear in the number of votes purchased; thus the total cost of votes is quadratic in the number purchased. The revenues earned from that individual are then refunded to other individuals.
When there are a large number of individuals, this Quadratic Vote Buying mechanism is efficient in any Bayesian equilibrium under symmetric independent private values and is usually nearly efficient even with aggregate uncertainty. Collusion by a small group or individuals’ taking on (a small number of) multiple identities does not significantly reduce efficiency.
 
*****
 

September 24, 2013
11:00 - 12:30
Location: Ground Floor Library, Department of Economics, Building 081

Guillaume CARLIER (Dauphine)

Title: "Equilibria, Transport and Optimization"

Abtsract: In this talk, I will present various models with a continuum of players for which equilibria can be obtained by minimization and transport arguments. I will start from the Kantorovich duality, its equilibrium interpretation and its connection to discrete choice models. Then we will treat congestion games, matching for teams (joint work with Ivar Ekeland), Cournot Nash equilibria (joint work with Adrien Blanchet) and conclude with a glimpse into the Mean-Field Games theory of Jean-Michel Lasry and Pierre-Louis Lions.

 

Organized by Raïcho Bojilov